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The metaphysical dichotomy. A true statement is necessary	iff	
it	is	impossible	for	it	to	be	false.	Otherwise	it	is	contingent.1
The epistemic dichotomy. A true statement is a priori	iff	it	can	
be	known	 independently	of	 experience.	Otherwise	 it	 is	
empirical (or a posteriori).




not	a	dichotomy	but	a	trichotomy	—	between	necessary truths, necessary false-
hoods and contingencies.	The	 same	goes,	mutatis mutandis,	 for	 the	epistemic	
and	semantic	dichotomies.	
2.	 It	 is	 presently	 something	of	 a	 received	view:	 (i)	 that	 the	necessary/contin-
gent and a priori/empirical	dichotomies	apply	in	the	first	instance	to proposi-
tions;	 (ii)	 that	 these	 two	dichotomies	 also	 apply	derivatively	 to	 statements	
that	express	propositions,	with	a	statement	inheriting	the	metaphysical	and	
epistemic	statuses	of	the	proposition	it	expresses;	but	(iii)	that	the	analytic/
synthetic	dichotomy	instead	applies	only to statements, not to the propositions 
they	express.	I	won’t	challenge	this	received	view	in	the	present	paper.	Ac-
cordingly,	 I	will	work	 always	 at	 the	 level	 of	 statements,	 not	 that	 of	 propo-
sitions.	 However,	 I	 will	 argue	 elsewhere	 that	 the	 received	 view	 is	 poorly	
motivated and that there are strong reasons for thinking that all three modal 
dichotomies	 apply	 in	 the	first	 instance	 to propositions.	 It	 is	 also	 sometimes	
suggested	that	the	analytic/synthetic	dichotomy	applies	to	sentences.	This	is	
implausible,	 since	 statements	have	determinate	meanings	while	 sentences	
(often)	don’t	(Hospers,	1967,	163).	For	example,	an	utterance	of	the	sentence	
‘Banks	 are	monetary	 institutions’	might	 be	 either	 an	 analytically	 true	 state-
ment	or	a	synthetic	falsehood,	depending	on	whether	the	context	is	indicative	
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A	modal	category	“has	members”	if	statements	belonging	in	that	cat-










that there are just two types of statements, relations of ideas and mat-
ters of fact.	The	former	are	(in	my	terminology)	NAA	statements,	being	
necessary,	a priori	and	analytic.	An	example	is	(1).	The	latter	are	CES	






omies	 are	 co-extensive	 and	 collapse	 into	 a	 single	 dichotomy	—	that	











NAA:	Necessary,	A priori and Analytic
NAS:	Necessary,	A priori and Synthetic
NEA:	Necessary,	Empirical	and	Analytic
NES:	Necessary,	Empirical	and	Synthetic
CAA:	Contingent, A priori and Analytic





























thinking	 statements	 are	more	modally	 diverse	 than	Hume’s	 fork	 al-
lows,	none	of	them	has	challenged	a	weaker	Humean	doctrine	to	the	




Setting	 aside	 the	 apparent	 unlikelihood	 of	 octopropositional-
ism’s	being shown to be true, why, if it were true, would its truth mat-
ter?	 Its	 truth	would	be	 important	 for	 the	same	reasons	 that	Kripke’s	







Kant	 argued,	 contra	Hume,	 that	 statements	 of	 a	 third	 type	 exist:	
















5.	 For	Hume,	 (3)	 is	 instead	known	empirically,	via	 introspection,	making	 it	 a	
CES	statement.
6.	 I	add	an	‘if	anything	is’	clause	to	cover	reference-failure	that	Kripke	doesn’t	
include,	although	see	(Kripke,	1980,	110).	Evans’	 (1982,	31)	 ‘Julius	 invented	
the	zip’	example	would	serve	just	as	well	as	(6),	as	would	similar	examples	
due	to	Swinburne	(1975,	234,	243).
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2. Conjunction and disjunction








trumps apriority, in the sense that if either p or q is empiri-
cal,	then	‘p∧q’	is	empirical	too.
T3.	 In	a	 conjunction	of	 two	 truths,	p and q,	 syntheticity	




sense that if either p or q	is	necessary,	then	‘p∨q’	is	neces-
sary	too.
T5.	In	a	disjunction,	apriority	trumps	empiricalness,	in	the	






ing	 apriority	 as	 a	 reliable	 guide	 to	necessity	 and	vice versa.	 If	 octop-
ropositionalism	were	correct,	then	the	same	lesson	would	apply	with	
absolute	generality:	no modal attribute of a statement would be a reli-

































Most entries in these tables are (relatively) uninteresting for one or 
both	of	these	reasons:
(a)	The	“child”	statement	obtained	by	conjoining	or	dis-
joining p with q	belongs	to	the	same	modal	category	as	









T6.	 In	 a	 disjunction,	 analyticity	 trumps	 syntheticity,	 in	
the sense that if either p or q	 is	 analytic,	 then	 ‘p∨q’	 is	  
analytic	too.9
For	example,	let	p	be	any	contingent	truth.	Since	p	is	contingent,	it	is	
possible for p	 to	be	false.	Thus,	it	 is	possible	for	p∧q to be false, irre-
spective	of	whether	q	is	necessary	or	contingent	(p∧q being false if p 
is).	And	so,	p’s	status	as	a	contingent	truth	is	inherited	by	p∧q.	In	short,	




egory that p∧q	belongs	to	is	determined	by	which	categories	p and q 
belong	to.	The	operative	trumping	rules	are	T1,	T2	and	T3.
Table 1.	How	the	modal	categories	of	p and q determine the mod-
al	category	of	p∧q.
9.	 The	 conjunctive	 rules	 contain	a	 clause,	 ‘of	 two	 truths’,	 that	 the	disjunctive	
rules	lack.	The	clause	is	included	in	order	to	exclude	certain	problematic	cas-
es	(e.	g.,	as	when	q=¬p)	from	the	scope	of	the	conjunctive	rules.	
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Putting	all	 these	 rules	 together,	we	obtain	 two	 “recipes”	by	which	a	
“full	house”	of	all	 eight	 types	of	 statements	can	be	constructed	 from	
only	three	“raw	ingredients”.






Recipe	1	 (which	uses	Rule	3	 to	construct	CEA	statements	 from	NEA	
and	CAA	ingredients)	will	therefore	be	the	focus	from	now	on.


















CES:	 Causation	 exists,	 and	 water	 is	 H
2
















Hence	octopropositionalism	can	be	defended	either by showing that 
C1	obtains	or	by	showing	that	C2	obtains.	Whoever	denies	octopropo-
sitionalism must deny both	that	C1	obtains	and	that	C2	obtains.
Notice	 the	 dramatic	 shift	 in	 burdens	 of	 proof	 that	 has	 just	 been	




that	 in	 practice	 the	 octopropositionalist	 only	 needs	 to	 demonstrate	




That’s	 the	good	news	 for	 the	octopropositionalist.	The	bad	news	
is	 that	one	of	 these	 two	ways	of	proceeding	 can	be	almost	 immedi-
ately	discounted.	In	order	to	be	able	to	use	Recipe	2,	it	would	first	be	




















Apriority	and	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	do	not	themselves qualify as 
analytic	 judgements.	 (One	 can’t	 discover	 that	 an	 analytic	 statement	
must	be	necessary	or	that	it	must	be	a priori	just	by	unpacking	Kant’s	
definition	of	‘analytic’.)




not	 need	 to	 go	beyond	my	 concept	 at	 all	 in	 order	 to	 formulate	 the	
judgment,	and	therefore	need	no	testimony	from	experience	for	that”	
(1998,	B11).	Here	he	is	making	the	following	tacit	assumption:
K1.	 The	 meaning	 (and	 thus	 the	 full	 truth-conditional	
import)	 of	 a	 concept,	 or	 of	 a	 thought,	 is	 accessible	 to	  
a priori reflection.
If R(s)	is	analytic,	then	K1	implies	that	a priori reflection	will	be	able	to	
detect	that	this	is	so	(i.	e.,	a priori	reflection	will	be	able	to	detect	that	
the	predicate,	R,	is	contained	in	the	idea	of	the	subject,	s),	from	which	





3. On the analytic/synthetic distinction
The	analytic/synthetic	distinction	was	coined	by	Kant,	who	took	the	
following	pair	of	doctrines	to	be	true:
Analyticity Entails Apriority:	 All	 analytic	 statements	 are	  
a priori.










into the notion of analyticity,	 thereby,	 in	effect,	making	 it	analytic	 that	
octopropositionalism	 is	 false.	For	example,	Kripke	provides	a	 trivial-
izing	definition	when	he	writes:12
[L]et’s	 make	 it	 a	 matter	 of	 stipulation	 that	 an	 analytic	
statement is, in some sense, true by virtue of its meanings 
and true in all possible words by virtue of its meaning.	(Kripke,	
1980,	39,	my	italics.)
This	is	a	trivializing	definition	because	it	builds	the	notion	of	necessity	
(i.	e.,	of	being	true	 in	all	possible	worlds)	directly	 into	 the	notion	of	
12.	 Kripke	later	acknowledges	that	analyticity	might	instead	be	defined	in	a	way	
that	 enables	 certain	 contingent	 statements,	 like	 (6),	 to	 count	 as	 ‟analytic”	
(1980,	122n).













(i.	e.,	 true	 in	 all	 possible	 worlds)	 in	 virtue	 of	 meaning	
alone.	Otherwise	it	is	“synthetic”.
Notice	that	AnSyn3	is	a	trivializing	definition,	for	it	defines	analyticity	
as	 a	 subspecies	 of	 necessity.	 If	 Kant	 had	 intended	 the	 analytic/syn-
thetic	 distinction	 to	be	understood	 along	 the	 lines	of	AnSyn3,	 then	
he	wouldn’t	have	needed	to	rely	on	K1	and	K2	in	order	to	argue	for	
Analyticity	Entails	Necessity.	This	being	so,	we	must	endorse	AnSyn2,	





but	which	 sometimes	 falls	 short	 of	 determining	 a	 statement’s	 truth-
















my	 purposes,	 but	 Kant’s	 thought	was	 that	 judgements	 about	 neces-
sity	could	not	be	empirical	and	must	therefore	be	triggered	by	judge-
ments	about	apriority.	For	example,	he	writes:	"Experience	teaches	us,	
to	be	sure,	 that	something	is	constituted	thus	and	so,	but	not	 that	 it	
could	not	be	otherwise.	[Thus]	if	a	statement	is	thought	along	with	its	
necessity,	it	is	an	a priori judgment”	[1998,	B3].)
K1	 and	K2	 are	 substantive,	 non-trivial,	 synthetic	 doctrines	 about	
the	 relation	between	meaning,	 rationality	 and	possibility.	This	 is	 re-
vealed	by	the	fact	that	received	opinion	nowadays	is	that	they	are	false.	
Both	were	accepted	as	self-evidently	correct	by	philosophers	for	two	
centuries	after	the	Critique of Pure Reason’s	publication,	until	—	to	uni-
versal	 astonishment	—	Putnam	 (1973)	 demolished	 K1	 with	 his	 Twin	
Earth	thought	experiment	and	Kripke	(1980)	demolished	K2	with	his	
arguments in Naming and Necessity.	More	will	be	said	about	Putnam’s	





With	 this	point	 in	mind,	 let’s	 turn	 to	 the	question	as	 to	how	 the	
analyticity/syntheticity	distinction	should	be	framed.	It	is	traditionally	
framed	as	follows:
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All	analytical	 judgments	 rest	entirely	on	 the	 law	of	con-








However,	Kant	 is	being	a	 little	careless	here.	Suppose	p	 is	contradic-
tory.	 LNC	 allows	 us	 to	 infer,	 on	 this	 basis,	 that	 p	 is	 false.	 But	 LNC	
doesn’t	allow	us	to	get	from	the	falsity	of	p	to	the	conclusion	that	¬p is 
(analytically)	true.	This	step	instead	requires	the	use	of	another	funda-








however,	 LEM	 is	 denied	 by	 constructivists	 and	 LNC	 by	 paraconsis-
tentists,	 and	so	AnSyn7	 rests	on	assumptions	about	deductive	 logic	
that	are	vigorously	contested.	Fortunately,	we	can	frame	the	analytic/







AnSyn4:	 A	 statement	 is	 "analytic”	 iff	 it	 is	 actually	 true	
in virtue of its narrow	 meaning	 alone.	 Otherwise	 it	 is	
“synthetic”.
AnSyn5:	A	statement	is	“analytic”	iff	it	is	actually	true	in	vir-
tue of its wide	meaning	alone.	Otherwise	it	is	“synthetic”.
According	to	AnSyn4,	the	kind	of	“meaning”	relevant	to	analyticity	is	





like	AnSyn4	 in	mind,	 then	he	would	not	have	needed	 to	 rely	on	K1	
to	argue	 for	Analyticity	Entails	Apriority.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	perfectly	clear	













diction	(LNC),	that all contradictions are false.	For	instance,	he	writes:
15. If the notion of ‟narrow	content”	 is	ultimately	 incoherent	 (Stalnaker,	 1989,	
1990,	2008;	Wilson,	1995),	then	this	provides	another,	even	quicker	reason	to	
opt	for	AnSyn5.	




























the question? Kant held that a priori	 synthetic	 truths	 are	known	via	
a	 special	 kind	 of	 deduction	—	a	 transcendental deduction — that draws 
on	rational	 insights	into	the	limits	of	possible	experience	and	imagi-
nation.	According	to	Kant,	ϕ will be a priori	and	yet	synthetic	 if	ϕ is 
not	provable	by	logic	(i.	e.,	it	is	not	analytic)	but	if	the	rational	mind	
can	recognize	of	itself	that	it	is	incapable	of	coherently	perceiving	or	
17.	 For	a	more	recent	discussion,	see	(Boghossian, 1997, 339, 345–350).








constructivists	 and	 paraconsistentists	 to	 agree	 in	 accepting	AnSyn8	
even	while	diverging	radically	in	their	answers	to	the	second	question.	
A	problem	remains.	Consider	(8):
(8)	 At	 least	 one	 of	 the	 following	 logical	 principles	 is	
sound:	LEM,	LNC	or	modus ponens.
(8)	makes	 an exceedingly modest	 claim	 about	 the	 foundations	 of	 log-
ic	—	a	 claim	so	modest	 it	will	be	accepted	not	only	by	 classical	 logi-
cians,	but	also	by	constructivists	and	paraconsistentists.	Constructiv-
ists	repudiate	LEM	and	paraconsistentists	repudiate	LNC,	but	it	would	






whose	 truth	 is	 in	 question.	 Such	 a	 proof	 is	 obviously	worthless	 for	
persuasive	purposes,	since	it	presupposes	what	is	being	proved,	but	
AnSyn8	 doesn’t	 prohibit	 viciously	 circular	 deductions.	 For	 this	 rea-
son,	when	AnSyn8	is	combined	with	any	remotely	tenable	view	about	
16.	 In	the	unlikely	event	of	a	coherent	and	useful	new	logic	being	proposed	that	
disclaimed	LNC	and LEM	and modus ponens, my overall point would still stand, 
since	I	could	simply	further	weaken	(8)	by	adding	to	the	disjunction	a	prin-
ciple	that	the	new	logic	relies	on.
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laws	 that	 “it	 seems	to	me	an	attempt	 to	 jump	out	of	one’s	own	skin	
against	which	I	can	do	no	more	than	urgently	warn	them”	(1964,	15).
In	order	to	capture	the	idea	that	(8)	is	synthetic	rather	than	analytic,	










2.	 For	 reasons	 just	 explained,	 it	 disambiguates	 AnSyn1	
in	 a	 way	 that	 appears	 to	 honor	 Kant’s	 linguistic	 inten-
tions.	 Since	 Kant	 both	 coined	 the	 analytic/synthetic	
distinction	 and	 made	 groundbreaking	 use	 of	 it	 in	 his	
own	hugely	 influential	philosophical	 system,	one	could	
break	usage	with	Kant	 and	use	 the	 terms	 ‘analytic’	 and	
‘synthetic’	 at	 cross-purposes	 to	 him	 only	 at	 the	 price	





4. Why NAS statements exist
Kant	reputedly	showed	long	ago	that	NAS	statements	(which	are	neces-
sary, a priori and	synthetic)	exist.	He	provided	many	examples,	includ-
ing	(4).	Matters	might	just	be	left	there.	But	some	of	Kant’s	examples	
conceiving	any	state	of	affairs	 that	would	 falsify	or	contradict	ϕ.	 (8)	
fulfills	this	condition.	We	find	that	the	rational	mind	can	only	coher-
ently	 imagine,	experience	and	conceive	 the	world	as	conforming	 to	



















deavors to think in opposition to these laws, our Reason 
acknowledges	 them	to	be	 the	conditions	of	all	possible	
thinking:	we	 then	find	out,	 that	 it	 is	 just	 as	 impossible	
to think in opposition to them, as it is to move the mem-




larity, he writes of people who would question the soundness of these 
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described	by	deductive	logic,	and	so,	in	part,	by	(8).	As	Wittgenstein	












it were Kantian a priori	synthetic	knowledge.	
In	short,	(8)	appears	to	be	necessary,	a priori	and	synthetic	—	mak-
ing	it	a	NAS	statement.	











































a world where deductive logic doesn’t work, and the idea of there being 
such	a	(logically)	possible	world	is	an	oxymoron.	We	cannot	imagine	
such	a	world,	because	our	imaginative	capabilities	have	limits	—	limits	
18.	 Why	necessary?	Because,	 in	Hume’s	words,	 “It	 is	 an	 established	maxim	 in	
metaphysics,	That	whatever	the	mind	clearly	conceives,	includes	the	idea	of	
possible	existence,	or	in	other	words,	that	nothing	we	imagine	is	absolutely	














(and, indeed, not only actually true, but necessarily	true).19
Chief	among	the	reasons	why	octopropositionalism	appears	prima 





onstration that ‟meanings	 ain’t	 in	 the	 head”	 (Rey,	 2016,	 §4.2).	 It	 as-
sumes	that	the	meanings	of	one’s	words,	and	their	truth-conditional	








6. Why CAA statements exist
As	mentioned	 in	§1,	prospective	examples	of	CAA	statements	—	i.	e.,	
statements	 that	 are	 contingent,	 a priori	 and	 analytic	—	include	 both	
Kripke’s	(6)	and	Kaplan’s	(7):
(6)	 The	 Standard	 Meter	 Bar	 is	 one	 meter	 long,	 if	  
anything	is.
(7)	I	am	here	now.
19. More generally, any statement of the form R(D)=R(E) will be of type NEA, 
where:	(i)	D and E	are	a	pair	of	non-rigid	definite	descriptions	(like	‘the	morn-
ing	star’	and	‘the	evening	star’)	that,	as	an	empirically	discoverable	matter	of	
fact,	designate	the	same	thing	in	the	actual	world;	(ii)	R(x) rigidly designates 
whatever is actually	 designated	by	 the	definite	description,	x; and (iii) x=y 
returns at world w	iff	x and y designate the same thing in w.	
Finally,	 is	 (5)	analytic	or	synthetic?	AnSyn9	 implies	 that	 it	 is	ana-
lytic,	for	reasons	I	will	explain	by	reference	to	Putnam’s	‟Twin	Earth”	







which	 is,	 however,	 superficially	 indistinguishable	 from	 H
2
O.	 Oscar	
and	 Toscar	 are	molecule-for-molecule	 doppelgängers	 of	 each	 other,	
and	hence	 indistinguishable	with	 regards	 to	 their	 internal	psycholo-
gies.	But	Putnam	points	out	that	their	psychological	similarity	doesn’t	
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is	 an	NEA	statement;	or	 (iv)	deny	of	both	 (6)	 and	 (7)	 that	 they	are	













22. More generally, any statement of the form F(D)∨(R(D)=D) will be of type 
CAA,	where:	(i)	D	is	some	non-rigid	definite	description	that	picks	out	its	ref-
erent	by	describing	an	accidental	property	of	the	referent	(like	‘the	inventor	
of	bifocals’);	(ii)	F(D)	returns	TRUE	at	world	w	iff	D fails to designate anything 
in w; (iii) R(D) rigidly designates whatever is actually designated by D; and 







is	contingent	because	although	it	is	actually true that I am here now, 
counterfactually	I	might	not	have	been:	I	could	have	been	somewhere	
else	now,	 instead.	 (7)	 is	a priori	because	mere	rational	 reflection	suf-
fices	 to	establish	 that	 ‘I	am	here	now’	 is	 (actually)	 true,	and	no	pos-
sible	experience	could	disconfirm	this	claim.20	Finally,	(7)	is	analytic	
because	 the	meanings	 (both	wide	 and	narrow)	 of	 the	 terms	 ‘I’,	 ‘am’,	
‘here’	 and	 ‘now’	 suffice	 by	 themselves	 to	 determine	 that	 (7)	 is	 actu-
ally (albeit not necessarily)	true.	(The	definition	of	‘here’	is	such	that	in	
my	mouth	it	rigidly	designates	the	spatial	location	where	I	actually am 















all	such	measurements.)	Finally,	AnSyn9	 implies	 that	(6)	 is	analytic:	
for	given	that	we	can	deduce	that	(6)	is	actually	true	by	merely	con-
templating	the	above	definition	of	‘one	meter’,	it	is	obvious	that	(6)	is	
20.	This	assumes	that	Descartes	was	right	and	that	one	can	know	a priori that the 
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have	shown	that	Recipe	1	can	be	used	to	construct	logically compound 
statements belonging in the NAA, NES, CAS, CEA and CES	categories.	
Which	of	these	categories	can	also	be	filled	with	atomic statements (not 





tween truths that are knowable a priori and knowable empirically	can	be	
turned	into	a	trichotomy	by	also	recognizing	truths	that	are	unknow-
able	 (a	plausible	example	being	Goldbach’s	conjecture).24 This gives 
rise	 to	 twelve	modal	categories,	 rather	 than	the	eight.	Do	all	 twelve	
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purported	 Kripkean	 and	 Putnamian	 counterexamples	 to	 Analyticity	
Entails	Apriority	and	Analyticity	Entails	Necessity	 (e.	g.,	 (5)	and	(6))	
by adopting a trivializing	construal	of	the	analytic/synthetic	distinction,	
like	AnSyn3	and/or	AnSyn4.	To	borrow	a	line	from	Bertrand	Russell	









we	 should	 register	 Kripke’s	 and	 Putnam’s	 groundbreaking	 discover-
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